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Abstract. Phenomenological states are generally considered 
sources of intrinsic motivation for autonomous biological agents. 
In this paper we will address the issue of exploiting these states 
for robust goal-directed systems. We will provide an analysis of 
consciousness in terms of a precise definition of how an agent 
“understands” the informational flows entering the agent. This 
model of consciousness and understanding is based in the 
analysis and evaluation of phenomenological states along 
potential trajectories in the phase space of the agents. This 
implies that a possible strategy to follow in order to build 
autonomous but useful systems is to embed them with the 
particular, ad-hoc phenomenology that captures the requirements 
that define the system usefulness from a requirements-strict 
engineering viewpoint.12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Research into machine consciousness is justified in terms of 
the potential increase of functionality [25] but also as a source of 
experimentation with models of human consciousness to 
evaluate their value [19].  
Even when there are old arguments against the possibility 
of machine consciousness3, several attempts at realisations of 
machine consciousness have been done recently [19]. In some 
cases, these systems propose a concrete theory of consciousness 
explicitly addressing artificial agents [15, 10] but in other cases 
the implementations follow psychological or neural theories of 
human consciousness developed without considering machines 
as potential targets for them. This is true, for example in the case 
of the many implementations of Baars’ Global Workspace 
Theory of consciousness [3, 21, 13, 26].  
These are very valuable efforts that help clarify the many 
issues surrounding consciousness and foster a movement 
towards making more precise the sometimes too-philosophical 
terms used in this domain. All these different implementations 
—if accepted as conscious— may be considered as exemplars in 
an attempt towards an ostensive definition of consciousness that 
includes humans and maybe also some animals [4].  
However as pointed out by Sloman [28] “pointing at 
several examples may help to eliminate some misunderstandings 
by ruling out concepts that apply only to a subset of the 
examples, but still does not identify a concept uniquely since any 
set of objects will have more than one thing in common.” In a 
sense, the only possibility of real, sound advance in machine 
consciousness is to propose and risk a background theory against 
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to which experiments are done and evidence thrown. This is 
indeed the path followed by the works previously mentioned of 
Chella, Haikonen, Franklin, Arrabales or Shanahan. However, 
most of the approaches are focused on just one aspect of 
consciousness [5]. The multifarious character of consciousness is 
an obvious problem.  
Indeed, Sloman [28] suggests that the main difficulty that 
we confront in the research on consciousness and machine 
consciousness is related to the polymorphic nature of the 
consciousness concept. This may seem to imply that trying to 
tackle several aspects of consciousness -access consciousness, 
phenomenal consciousness, self-awareness, etc. — in one single 
shot —a single model, a single robot— is hopeless. This 
program of addressing consciousness as a whole is also 
hampered by the semantical flaws that some of the conceptions 
of consciousness suffer when abstracted from specific contexts.  
However, Sloman also recognises that “perhaps one day, 
after the richness of the phenomena has been adequately 
documented, it will prove possible to model the totality in a 
single working system with multiple interacting components.” 
This is, boldly, what we try to do inside our long term ASys 
research program. In order to progress in the systematic 
engineering of autonomous, robust agents, we will try to make 
them conscious. And will try to do so by using a single, general 
and unified theory of consciousness4.  
The approach taken in this effort directly attacks the 
polymorphic nature of the concept. We will express general 
consciousness mechanisms in the form of architectural patterns 
that will be instantiated in the several forms that are necessary 
for the specific uses of a particular agent. This approach breaks 
up the unicity/variety problem of consciousness, leveraging a 
single structure for different uses.  
2 THE REASONS FOR ACTING  
The quest for control architectures for artificial autonomous 
agents confronts a problem concerning the relations between the 
goals of the agent and the goals of the owner. This is very much 
connected with the value systems of humans and how these drive 
their behaviour [23].  
Phenomenological states are generally considered sources 
of intrinsic motivation for autonomous biological agents. At the 
end of the day, what counts is the phenomenology. What is 
relevant for the agent is how the internal changes concerning its 
perception of the world and of itself impacts its experiential state 
[9].  
To be more precise, for us humans, what counts is the 
integral, i.e. an accumulated value,  of the phenomenological 
states along the lived trajectories —past, present and future. This 
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is the very foundation for acting —the reasons to act— and the 
very grounding of ethics. We just care about feeling well and 
having the right experiences. This may sound a bit selfish but 
even altruistic behaviour shall be gratifying in some sense 
(albeit, if this is right, in a phenomenological sense).  
This position will be clarified later in terms of what it 
means saying that the phenomena are the source of all behaviour. 
To do this we must enter into an analysis of the nature of 
meaning and consciousness. Both in natural and artificial 
settings.  
Following a general approach is necessary for the objective 
of the ASys program of targeting a universal theory of 
consciousness —in terms of enabling the construction of better 
autonomous systems— but it is also of maximal relevance when 
addressing the construction of systems interacting with humans. 
In order to provide machines suitable for interacting with 
humans’ lives —and most machines are designed to do so— it is 
necessary to understand this phenomenological grounding for 
action in humans and also it may be necessary to investigate the 
possibilities of such a phenomenological stance concerning the 
realization of machines.  
3 ABSTRACT ARCHITECTURE OF A 
CONSCIOUS MACHINE  
Our strategy in the search for a general architecture for 
consciousness is based in the identification of a set of 
architectural principles that will guide the definition of reusable 
design patterns [7]. An early version of these principles was 
presented in [25]. These principles offer precise but general 
definitions of some critical concepts in mind theory (like 
representation, perception, action, value, consciousness, etc.).  
 
 
Figure 1. The basic building blocks for a design and realisation 
of a conscious machine are polymorphic patterns. The figure 
shows two of the basic patterns used in the definition of the 
cognitive architecture of reference for general consciousness: 
EPISTEMICCONTROLLOOP and METACONTROL.  
The current set of design principles is the following:  
 
1. A cognitive system builds and exploits models of other 
systems in their interaction with them. These models are —
obviously— representations. They sustain the realisation of a  
model-based control architecture. Models are made at 
multiple levels of resolution and may be aggregated to 
constitute integrated representations. 
2. An embodied, situated, cognitive system is as good 
performer as its models are. The ideal condition is achieving 
isomorphism in a certain modelling space. It is important to 
note that models are always abstractions hence defining a 
modelling space that is inherently different from that of the 
modelled system.  
3. Except in degenerate cases, maximal timely performance is 
achieved using predictive models. What counts for an agent 
is the value got not only now, but from now on up to a fuzzy 
time horizon. The depth of the horizon will be dependent of 
the specific aspect that is anticipated.  
4. Perception is the continuous update of the integrated models 
used by the agent by means of real-time sensorial 
information. Perceiving is hence much more than sensing. 
Sensing is the mapping of physical estates of the sensed 
entity into informational states inside the perceiving agent. 
In a second stage perceptual mechanics updates/creates 
models to exploit this information. Note that models are 
necessarily based on a sustaining ontology. This implies that 
perception suffers model-related ontological blindness.  
5. Agents perceive and act based on multiple integrated, 
scalable, unified model of task, environment and self. Model-
based control is the core mechanism for action generation. 
This enables a search for global performance maximisation 
(obviously bounded by what is known/modelled). Model and 
action integration may happen at multiple scales.  
6. An aware system is continuously perceiving and computing 
meaning from the continuously updated models. Meaning is 
defined as the partitioning of state-space trajectories in terms 
of value for the agent. What is different in this proposal for a 
concept of meaning is that we are considering not only the 
current state of affairs but the potential future values for the 
agent.  
7. Models are executed by engines and may be collapsed with 
them into simpler subsystems. Model execution leverages 
models in the obtainment of many classes of data of 
relevance to the agent: actions, states, causes, means, etc. 
Model execution is hence necessarily continuous, multiple 
—forward, backward, means-ends, etc.— and concurrent. In 
some cases models and engines may be collapsed into a 
simple, more efficient element. Model-engine collapses are 
efficiency-exploitability tradeoffs. Collapsed models 
sacrifice multiple use to gain effectiveness.  
8. Attentional mechanisms allocate both physical and cognitive 
resources for system perceptive and modelling processes so 
as to maximize performance. The bandwidth of the sensory 
system is enormous and the perceptual task is not easy. The 
amount of sensed information that may be integrated in the 
mental models of the agent is bounded by the availability of 
resources. The allocation of resources to subsets of sensed 
information is done using cognitive control and also 
immediate anticipatory valuation (significance feedback). 
Note that this implies a primary form of perception before 
the conscious level.  
9. The agent reconfigures its functional organisation for 
context-pertinent behaviour using value-driven anticipatory 
metasignals. This is the role played by (some) emotional 
mechanisms [24].  
10. A self-aware system is continuously generating meanings 
from continuously updated self-models. The agent perceives 
and controls itself as it perceives and controls the world. 
“Self” is the closure of the executing self-model.  
 
These principles are being reified in the form of design 
patterns  (see Figure 1) and implemented using state of the art 
object-oriented software technologies.  
 
This pattern-based approach enables the formerly stated 
vision of having both a general approach and the concrete 
implementations necessary for the diversity of tasks that an agent 
must address.  
In this line of work, Hernández has proposed The Operative 
Mind (OM) [17] as an architectural framework for development 
of bespoke systems. This class of architectural reference model 
—in the line of RCS [1] or CogAff [29]— can be used for 
engineering systems which implement, as we claim, analogue 
functional capabilities to those reported —top-down causality, 
flexible control, integration, informational access, and intrinsic 
motivation— of biological consciousness. This enables, as a 
result, improved autonomy and robustness.  
 
 
Figure 2. The Higgs robot is the experimental platform used for 
the deployment of the OM Cognitive Architecture.  
 
Consciousness is implemented on it as a set of services, in 
an operating system fashion, based on deep modelling of its own 
control architecture [18], that supervises the adequacy of its 
structure to the current objectives in the given environment [20] 
triggering and managing adaptivity mechanisms. This system is 
being implemented in the control system of an autonomous 
mobile robot (see Figure 2).  
4 MODEL-BASED PREDICTIVE CONTROL 
AND PHENOMENOLOGY  
The architectural model proposed in the above principles is 
consonant with the model-based control strategies used in 
technical environments —industrial plants, aircraft, etc. [8].  
In model-based predictive control (MBPC), the controller 
produces the next instantaneous action by i) first projecting a 
desired trajectory of targets optimised for that goal, ii) then 
predicting the future consequences of the actions needed to 
follow that trajectory to obtain precisely an optimised plan of 
actions, and finally iii) executing only the first action in the plan; 
then the cycle starts over again.  
Notice that for step i) a cost function is used, which is both 
a model of the task and an evaluation procedure, and for ii) a 
model of the plant –i.e. system (body) and environment– is 
employed.  
So far, control systems based on advanced techniques such 
as MBPC contain informational structures and processes that our 
model could ascribe to access consciousness: they exploit 
updated models of the plant and evaluate in the view of the 
predicted future. But as far as the model do not include the 
system itself –i.e. the controller–, the system is not self-
conscious. This implies that there are no phenomenological 
states concerning the own agent involved.  
Now let us suppose that the system/controller includes a 
model of itself, so it evaluates not only the future environment 
states given its possible actions, but also its very own possible 
future states. Then we will have a system that, from sensory 
information flow, would generate informational structures 
containing an evaluation of its processing, not only current, but 
as predicted in the future according to its past. 
It is important to note that the evaluation is realised in terms 
of the value obtained by the agent. In the case of artificial control 
systems these values are imposed by externally grounded utility 
functions. In the case of biological systems these utility 
functions are internal and expressed in terms of what is good and 
bad for the agent: i.e. its experience. The metaperception of the 
agent as perceiver sustains the valuation of goodness of states. 
This may constitute the very substrate of phenomenology: the 
system, by virtue of the described process, would be 
experiencing that sensory input.  
The grounding of experience on model-based 
metaperception provides an operational understanding of the 
“what is it like to be” question [22]. To know what is it like to be 
a bat would require not only the echolocation sensory system but 
the full perceptual pipeline and the metaperceptual pipeline. We 
cannot experience being a bat if we don’t meet these 
requirements, but, however, we can have a deep theory of what it 
is like to be a bat and hence know “what is it like to be it”.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The self-perception, self-configuration meta-loop shares the patterned structure of the EPISTEMICCONTROLLOOP.  The meta-
level gathers information about the functional organisation of the lower epistemic control loop and may act to change it. The 
observed/controlled world of the metaloop is a functioning cognitive agent. 
 
 
Note that the action part of the meta loop shown in Figure 3 
shows action modifying the workings of the lower, world-
situated loop. The meta-control competences enabled by self 
perception constitute the active part of emotional mechanisms 
[24]. In a sense, consciousness, meaning and emotion are 
stepping-stones in the same road [2].  
5 MEANING AND THE FUTURE  
In this paper we provide an analysis of ‘consciousness” in 
terms of a precise definition of how an agent “understands” the 
informational flows entering the agent. This definition of 
understanding is based in the analysis and evaluation of 
phenomenological states along potential trajectories in the phase 
space of the agents.  
We propose a rigorous definition of “meaning” in terms of 
the separation of potential agent trajectories in different value 
classes —consider that the information flows are a critical 
resource for trajectory enaction and separation. The values to be 
computed will not be in the particular space of magnitudes of an 
external, third person observer but in the magnitudes of 
relevance to the agent: i.e. the phenomenological ones. This 
computation requires from the agent an intrinsic capacity for 
anticipation —including anticipation of phenomenological 
states.  
Note that in this context phenomenological is not restricted 
to the limited interpretation in terms of qualia, but in the broader 
sense of phenomenal structure [30]:  
“the phenomenal structure of experience is richly 
intentional and involves not only sensory ideas and qualities but 
complex representations [our models] of time, space, cause, 
body, self, world and the organized structure of the lived reality”  
For the reasons stated before, this model —of meaning and 
consciousness— shall be of applicability both to humans and 
robots, hence implying a rigorous analysis and definition of 
phenomenological states —because rigour is necessary if this is 
going to be built into the robots and not just predicated from 
some externally observed behaviour.  
Clarifying these issues is not only of relevance for robot 
construction but also for advancing into a general theory of 
consciousness both operational in the technological side and 
explanatory in the biological one —e.g. being useful to create 
safer machines [25] and being able to explain the nature of pain 
asymbolia [14].  
Consider the situation of a system at certain time (now, t0) 
where the system must decide what to do based on a certain 
information it has received (see Figure 4). The system has 
followed a certain trajectory x(t) in its state space but the future 
is open concerning the different possibilities for acting (Aa, Ab, 
Ac). The concrete future trajectory will depend on the concrete 
action, but will also depend on the concrete state of the world 
and the agent at t0. The meaning of a piece of information —
about the world or about the agent itself– is the way it partitions 
the set of possible future trajectories in terms of anticipated 
phenomenological states.  
How is this meaning enacted? By integration of the 
information received into the model that the agent uses to predict 
the future and by executing this model in forward time. In a 
sense, grasping the meaning of some information is leveraging 
this information in enhancing the prediction of how reality is 
going to behave.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Understanding sensory flows and the derived 
emotional processes are strongly related to the anticipatory 
capabilities of the agents.  
 
 
This interpretation of meaning and consciousness is indeed 
not new. As Woodbridge said [31] in relation to potential 
definitions of consciousness [6]: Professor Bode states the 
general problem tersely, it seems to me, when he asks, ”When an 
object becomes known, what is present that was not present the 
moment before ?” I have attempted to answer that question in 
one word — ”meaning.”  
Phenomenology goes beyond the experiential qualities of 
sensed information. Haikonen argues that qualia are the primary 
way in which sensory information manifests itself in mind [16] 
but in our model this qualitative manifestation is not necessarily 
primary but may be produced in downstream stages of the 
perceptual pipeline. What is important for us is not just the 
qualities of the sensed but the experience of their meaning. As 
Sloman and Chrisley [29] say, “an experience is constituted 
partly by the collection of implicitly understood possibilities for 
change inherent in that experience.”  
It must be noted that the model proposed is concurrent. This 
implies that the perceptual pipeline is operating in several 
percepts at the same time. But due to the integrated nature of the 
models —principle 5— these pipelines may eventually converge 
(in non pathological cases). This may imply a reduction of the 
focus of inner attention to a single percept. This is in line with 
Dennett’s multiple drafts theory of consciousness [11].  
6 CONCLUSSIONS: IS 
HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY A NEED ?  
Going back to the analysis done at the very beginning of the 
paper on the construction of autonomous systems, and after 
describing the architectural picture of the ASys model of 
autonomy and consciousness, we reach the conclusion that 
heterophenomenology is a need.  
However, heterophenomenology (phenomenology of others 
different from oneself) must be understood in a sense a bit 
different from the initial proposal of the term by Dennett [12] of 
using verbal reports (and other types of acts) as objective, third-
person observations that provide the observer with partial 
information about the agent’s beliefs regarding its own 
conscious experience.  
In this context, building machines that experience, the 
problem of engineering the right phenomenological mechanism 
is crucial because it will be the origin of the intrinsic motivations 
of the agents. We must adopt an heterophenomenological 
engineering approach in the sense of being able to engineer 
phenomenologies into machines to match our very own needs 
[33]. These will not be human phenomenologies but the 
phenomenologies that when deployed will make the agents 
pursue our satisfaction.  
But for this, we need not only a better understanding of the 
artificial [27] but of our own consciousness.  
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